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Abstract
Competitive pricing is a pricing rule that combines two principles
that are present in competitive markets. The proﬁt principle (an ac-
tion will be chosen only if it yields maximal payoﬀs), and the scarcity
principle (markets make expensive those commodities that restrict
production possibilities). It is shown that, under standard assump-
tions, these principles imply proﬁt maximization at given prices. But
also that they can be applied to economies with non-convex produc-
tion sets (e.g. ﬁrms with S-shaped production functions). The chief
properties of this pricing rule, as well as the existence and eﬃciency
of the associated equilibria, are analyzed.
JEL number: D50
Key words: non-convex production sets, competitive pricing rule, com-
petitive pricing equilibrium.
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I ti sw e l lk n o w nt h a tw h e nm a r k e t sa r ec o m p l e t ea n da g e n t sm a x i m i z eq u a s i -
concave objective functions over convex choice sets, taking prices as given,
competitive equilibrium exists and yields eﬃcient outcomes. Here we ap-
proach competitive behaviour from a slightly diﬀerent point of view, by
identifying some characteristic features of competitive markets that are in-
dependent of price-taking behaviour and can be applied to economies with
non-convex production sets. Non-convexities in production naturally arise
when there are increasing returns to scale, ﬁx e dc o s t s ,S - s h a p e dp r o d u c t i o n
functions, or when production involves the use of ﬁxed capital (that is, input
commodities that are functionally indivisible).1
T h ek e yc o n c e p tf o rt h ea n a l y s i si st h a to fcompetitive pricing.B y t h i s
we intend to summarize two principles that are present in competitive mar-
kets. The ﬁrst one is the proﬁtp r i n c i p l e , that says that an action will be
chosen only if it yields maximal payoﬀs. The second one is the scarcity prin-
ciple,t h a ts a y st h a ta g e n t sa r er e a d yt op a yf o rt h ea v a i l a b l ec o m m o d i t i e s
their maximum worth (i.e. the short-side of the market pays its reservation
value). This approach to competitive markets is applicable to situations in
which production sets are not convex. Moreover, the application of these two
principles turns out to be equivalent to proﬁt maximization at given prices,
when production sets are convex.
To discuss these ideas the commodity space is divided into two disjoint
subsets: capital goods and standard commodities. Capital goods are com-
modities already produced, hence part of the initial endowments, that are
inputs to production. These commodities include elements of ﬁxed capital,
indivisible goods or other type of inputs that may generate non-convexities
in production. Standard commodities consist of durable consumption goods
already produced, as well as those goods and services that are obtained from
production activities, including both new consumption goods and new input
commodities. Within this framework, we say that a ﬁrm behaves accord-
ing to competitive pricing whenever it ﬁnds acceptable a prices-production
combination such that:
(i) At these prices, there is no other production plan yielding higher
proﬁts and using fewer capital goods; namely, ﬁrms behave as constrained
proﬁt maximizers at given prices.
(ii) There is no price vector satisfying (i) with higher prices for capital
1Yet a competitive scenario is hardly compatible with pure increasing returns to scale.
Therefore, our aim is not to "solve" the problem of market equilibirum with increasing
returns to scale, but rather to approach competition in a way that is not totally dependent








goods. In other words, the prices of capital goods are maximal within those
satisfying constrained proﬁt maximization.
Part (i) reﬂects the proﬁt principle and can be regarded as a sort of partic-
ipation constraint. If this property were not satisﬁed, ﬁrms would be willing
(and able, given their restrictions) to change their input-output conﬁgura-
tions. Part (ii) expresses the scarcity principle: markets make expensive
those commodities that restrict production possibilities. Therefore, ﬁrms
must be ready to pay maximal prices for the capital goods they use, as long
as this is compatible with constrained proﬁt maximization. A situation in
which consumers maximize their preferences under their wealth restrictions,
ﬁrms behave according to the competitive pricing rule, and all markets clear
will be called a competitive pricing equilibrium.
This approach to competition enables to deal with short-run situations
in which ﬁrms can be thought of as ‘being small’ but not necessarily con-
vex. More speciﬁcally, we can think of a two-period economy in which ﬁrms
may use some elements of ﬁxed capital that generate non-convexities in pro-
duction (land, buildings or heavy machinery, say). The amounts of those
commodities are given a priori and restrict production possibilities. The al-
location of ﬁx e dc a p i t a li sd e c i d e di np e r i o do n e ,t a k e ni n t oa c c o u n tc u r r e n t
and future prices (these are investment decisions in a complete markets set-
ting). Firms compete in the capital goods market oﬀering the highest prices
that are compatible with their incentives. Production and consumption take
p l a c ei np e r i o d2 .N o wﬁrms choose those production plans that maximize
proﬁts, subject to the investment decisions made in period 1, and consumers
maximize utility at given prices.
The description of the economy is the subject of section 2. Section 3
introduces the competitive pricing rule and discusses its main properties. It
is shown that this pricing rule is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence
with non-empty, closed and convex values, and that it coincides with proﬁt
maximization when production sets are convex. The existence of equilibrium
is taken up in section 4, where we also discuss its (in)eﬃciency properties. We
show that a competitive pricing equilibrium exists under reasonably general
conditions, that equilibrium allocations will not be eﬃcient in general, and
also that eﬃciency can be obtained by a public intervention. The most
technical part is dealt with in an Appendix.
Let us conclude this section with some references to the literature. In
a general equilibrium context, the behaviour of non-convex ﬁr m si su s u a l l y
described in terms of pricing rules. A pricing rule is a mapping from the ﬁrm’s








prices-production pairs which a ﬁrm ﬁnds acceptable (a generalization of the
inverse supply mapping). This is the methodological approach followed here
to present the notion of competitive pricing. In this way we have beneﬁted
from the results already available on the existence of equilibrium [the reader
is referred to Bonnisseau & Cornet (1988), Brown (1991) or Villar (2000) for
details].
The idea of using quantity restrictions to analyze market equilibria in
economies with non-convex production sets is by no means new. The contri-
butions by Scarf (1986) and Dehez & Drèze (1988 a,b) and Villar (1996, ch.
9 and 10) are close antecedents to this work [see also Dierker, Guesnerie &
Neuefeiend (1985), Böhm, V.(1986), and Dierker & Neuefeind (1988)].
2T h e m o d e l
We consider here an economy with   commodities, n ﬁrms and m consumers.
Commodities are divided into two separate groups: capital goods and stan-
dard commodities. The number of commodities, ﬁrms and consumers is ﬁnite
and given ap r i o r i .
2.1 Commodities and ﬁrms
There are   commodities in this economy that can be classiﬁed either as
capital goods (input commodities already available as part of the initial
endowments) or standard commodities (stocks of pure consumption goods
as well as goods and services that become available through the production
process). Consequently, the set L = {1,2,..., } of commodity indices can be
partitioned into two disjoint subsets, LK = {1,2,...,k} and its complement,
LS = {k+1,k+2,..., }. Goods in LK are capital goods and goods in LS are
standard commodities. Capital goods are inputs to production that, together
with the technology, determine the eﬀective production possibilities.
T h e r ei sag i v e nn u m b e rn of ﬁrms. For j =1 ,2,...,n, Y j ⊂ R  de-
notes the jth ﬁrm’s production set, whereas yj ∈ Yj describes a production
plan. Within this framework it is convenient to write production plans in
the form yj =( aj,bj),w i t haj ∈− Rk
+ and bj ∈ R −k. That is, aj is a point
in the subspace of capital goods, and bj ap o i n ti nt h es u b s p a c eo fs t a n -
dard commodities. Note that no sign restriction is established on the vector
of standard commodities that can therefore include both input and output
commodities.
Let Fj stand for the jth ﬁrm’s set of weakly eﬃcient production plans.








then y0 cannot be in Yj. We shall denote by F the Cartesian product of the n
sets of weakly eﬃcient production plans; namely, F ≡ Πn
j=1Fj.Ap o i n ti nF
will be denoted by e y =( y1,y2,...,yn). A price vector is a point p ∈ R 
+. For
each pair (p,yj) ∈ R 
+ × Fj, the scalar product pyj gives us the associated
proﬁts.
The following deﬁnitions will help the ensuing discussion:
Deﬁnition 1 A commodity h is relevant for the jth ﬁrm if: (i) There exists
some yj ∈ Fj such that yjh > 0; or (ii) yjh ≤ 0 for all yj ∈ Fj, and there
exists y0
j ∈ Fjsuch that, for all λ>0, y0
j + λeh / ∈ Yj, where eh is the hth
canonical vector.
A commodity is relevant for the jth ﬁrm if there exists some production
plan for which it is either an eﬀective output or an eﬀective input. A com-
modity is an eﬀective output when there is some production plan involving
positive production of this commodity. A commodity is an eﬀective input
w h e nt h e r ei ss o m ep r o d u c t i o np l a nf o rw h i c hi ti sn o tp o s s i b l et or e d u c et h e
use of such a commodity without aﬀecting production possibilities. Relevant
commodities may refer to both capital goods and standard commodities. A
commodity which is not relevant for the jth ﬁrm is called irrelevant.
Deﬁnition 2 A production set Yj ⊂ R  is called “convex” (with inverted
c o m m a s )i fi ti sac o n v e xs e ti nt h es u b s p a c eo fi t sr e l e v a n tc o m m o d i t i e s .
Similarly, the projection of Yj on the space R −k of standard commodities is
“convex”,i fi ti sac o n v e xs e to nt h es u b s p a c eo fs t a n d a r dc o m m o d i t i e st h a t
are relevant for the jth ﬁrm.
A c c o r d i n gt ot h i sd e ﬁnition we call “convex” those production sets whose
non-convexities are inessential, in the sense that they derive from the presence
of irrelevant commodities. And the same applies to the projection of Yj on
the space of standard commodities. By extension, a ﬁrm is “non-convex”,
when it is non-convex on the subspace of relevant commodities.
Consider now the following axiom that applies to every j =1 ,2,...,n:
Axiom 1 (i) Yj i sac l o s e ds u b s e to fR , with Yj ∩R 
+ = {0} and Yj −R 
+ ⊂
Yj.
(ii) For all (aj,bj), (a0
j,b0
j) ∈ Fj, [aj ≥ a0
j & bj > b0
j]= ⇒ yj ≤ 0.
(iii) For every aj ∈− Rk
+ the set
Bj(aj) ≡ {bj ∈ R
 −k / (a
0











Part (i) of axiom 1 is standard in that it assumes closedness, necessity of
using up some input to obtain some output, comprehensiveness, and possi-
bility of inaction. It follows from this axiom that the set of weakly eﬃcient
production plans Fj consists exactly of those points in the boundary of Yj.
Part (ii) is a weak monotonicity requirement, that discards the presence of
vertical segments in that part of the boundary of Yj associated with posi-
tive production. It states that it is not possible to increase production while
keeping constant the use of input commodities. Clearly, when Yj is con-
vex part (ii) is implied by part (i). This property is closely related to that
of bounded marginal returns (i.e. the marginal rates of transformation are
bounded in all points involving positive production). Part (iii) substitutes
the assumption of convex production sets by a weaker requirement. It says
that, for any given vector of capital goods aj, the projection on R −k of those
production plans using fewer capital goods than those in aj is a convex set,
when restricted to the subspace of relevant commodities. This allows us to
include within these goods elements of ﬁxed capital that may give rise to
non-convexities. Observe that this assumption is compatible with the pres-
ence of ﬁrms with constant, decreasing or increasing returns to scale, set-up
costs or S-shaped production functions. Clearly, when Yj is convex, part (iii)
is automatically satisﬁed. And, conversely, if a ﬁrm does not require using
capital goods to develop production activities, then part (iii) implies that it
must be convex in the subspace of relevant commodities. Moreover, in the
one-input–one-output case, this property is implied by part (i).
The following examples illustrate standard families of production sets
satisfying axiom 1 (note that examples 2, 3 and 4 allow for the presence of
non-convexities in production):
Example 1 (Convex production sets) Standard “convex” production sets
satisfy these axioms. This is interesting because it ensures that these axioms
encompass the conventional way of modelling ﬁrms in general competitive
analysis.
Example 2 (Pure ﬁxed-cost) Those “non-convex” production sets in which
non-convexities are only due to the presence of ﬁxed cost. That is to say, once
a ﬁrm starts producing a positive amount of some good, the technology ex-
hibits constant or decreasing returns to scale [Cf. Moriguchi (1996)].
Example 3 (Single-production ﬁrms) The production set associated to
a monotone production function which produces a single good as a net-output,








Example 4 (Distributive production sets) A relevant case of produc-
tion sets with increasing returns to scale and joint production that satis-
ﬁes these axioms is that of distributive production sets, introduced by Scarf
(1986). He deﬁnes a distributive production set Yj as follows: for any col-
lection of points (yt,λ
t),t=1 ,2,...,s, with yt =( at,bt) ∈ Yj,λ













In words: A production set is distributive when any nonnegative weighted
sum of feasible production plans is feasible, if it does not use fewer capital
goods than any of the original plans.
The behaviour of ﬁrms will be described by means of pricing rules.A
pricing rule for the jth ﬁrm is a mapping Φj : Fj → R 
+, in which Φj(yj) tells
us the set of prices that this ﬁrm ﬁnds acceptable in order to produce yj. We
discuss the competitive pricing rule in the next section.
2.2 Consumers
There are m competitive consumers in the economy. The ith consumer is
characterized by a tuple [Xi,u i,ωi,(θij)n
j=1],w h e r eXi,u i,ω i stand for the
ith consumer’s consumption set, utility function, and initial endowments,
respectively, and θij denotes the ith consumer’s share in the proﬁts of the
jth ﬁrm (with 0 ≤ θij ≤ 1 for all i,j, and
Pm
i=1 θij =1for all j).
Let (p,e y) ∈ R 
+ × F be given. Then, the ith consumer’s demand is
obtained as a solution to the program:
Max ui (xi)
s.t. xi ∈ Xi






The behaviour of the ith consumer can be summarized by a demand
correspondence ξi : R 
+ × F → Xi,w h e r eξi(p,e y) is the set of solutions to
the program above.
The next axiom makes it explicit the modelization of consumers:
Axiom 2 For all i =1 ,2,...,m:
(a) Xi is a closed and convex subset of R , bounded from below.
(b) ui : Xi → R is a continuous and quasi-concave function, which satis-
ﬁes local non-satiation.
(c) ∃ xi ∈ Xi /ω i >> xi.









We call economy as p e c i ﬁcation of the m consumers and the n ﬁrms. An
economy can thus be described by:









i=1 ωi stand for the vector of initial resources available for the
economy. We can write ω =( ωK,ωS), to make it explicit the distinction
between capital goods and standard commodities. The set of attainable
allocations of an economy is given by:




i=1 xi − ω ≤
Pn
j=1 yj}
The projection of A(ω) on the spaces containing Xi,Y j g i v e su st h eith
consumer’s set of attainable consumption plans and the jth ﬁrm’s set of
attainable production plans, respectively.
We now introduce the following:
Axiom 3 For every ω0 ≥ ω,t h es e tA(ω0) is bounded.
Axiom 3 states that the set of attainable allocations is bounded. That is
to say, it is not possible to obtain unlimited amounts of production from a
ﬁnite amount of endowments.
3 Competitive pricing
3.1 Constrained proﬁt maximization
We associate the proﬁt principle to the notion of constrained proﬁtm a x i -
mization: ﬁrms maximize proﬁts subject to a capital goods constraint. To
deﬁne this pricing rule, one has to take into account that the proﬁt principle
imposes no restriction on prices when yj = 0. Hence, to avoid those trivial
equilibria in which all ﬁrms are inactive, we establish the following:
Deﬁnition 3 The constrained proﬁt maximization pricing rule for
the jth ﬁrm, is a mapping φj : Fj → R 
+ − {0} given by:
(i) For yj 6= 0,
φj(yj) ≡ {q ∈R 
+ − {0} / qyj ≥ qy0
j, ∀ y0
j ∈ Yj with a0
j ≥ aj}
(ii) φj(0) i st h ec l o s e dc o n v e xh u l lo ft h es e to fp o i n t sq ∈R 
+−{0}for which
there exists a sequence {qν,yν
j} ⊂ R 
+−{0}×[Fj−{0}], such that {qν,yν
j} →









Therefore, φj pictures the jth ﬁrm as selecting, for each given eﬃcient
production plan yj, prices such that it is not possible to obtain higher proﬁts
within the set of production plans which make use of equal or fewer capital
goods. Parts (ii) and (iii) of axiom 1 imply that the set Bj(aj) is convex
and comprehensive, with bj ∈ ∂Bj(aj), for all yj ∈ Fj. Both properties are
required for this pricing rule be well deﬁned.
Observe that, under axiom 1, φj is a loss-free pricing rule. That is to say,
qyj ≥ 0 for all q ∈ φj(yj), all yj ∈ Fj. Also note that φj(yj) is contained
in the set of marginal prices at yj, with respect to the truncated production
set Yj(aj)={y0
j ∈ Yj / a0
j ≥ aj}. When the input restriction is binding, the
set of marginal prices to Yj(aj) at yj is larger than the normal cone to Yj at
yj. Therefore, when Yj is convex, input-constrained proﬁt maximization is a
super-correspondence of the proﬁt maximization pricing rule.
The following result summarizes the key properties of this pricing rule,
under the assumptions established:
Theorem 1 [Villar (2000, Th. 8.1)] Under axiom 1 the constrained proﬁt
maximization pricing rule satisﬁes the following properties, for all yj ∈ Fj:
(i) φj is a closed correspondence whose values are non-degenerate closed
convex cones.
(ii) qyj ≥ 0, for all q ∈ φj(yj).
The proﬁt principle may be regarded as a minimal requirement for mar-
ket economies. Yet, it is not very tight as this principle alone imposes few
restrictions on the allocation of capital goods (e.g. zero prices for capital
goods cannot be excluded). Therefore, constrained proﬁt maximization may
encompass too many market situations; in particular, it does not imply com-
petitive equilibrium when production sets are convex. Put informally, the
correspondence φj is too large.
3.2 The competitive pricing rule
We now consider a selection of the constrained proﬁt maximization pricing
rule, called competitive pricing, that incorporates another characteristic ele-
ment of competitive markets: the scarcity principle. The underlying idea is
that markets make expensive those commodities that constrain production
possibilities. More speciﬁcally, competitive pricing requires the ﬁrms to pay









Let us formalize this idea. For a given price vector q ∈ R 
+, let us write
q(j)= (q0(j),q1(j)), where q0(j) is the vector of prices for the jth ﬁrm rel-
evant capital goods, and q1(j) its complement. Let now b φj : Fj → R 
+ be
deﬁned as follows:
b φj(yj) ≡ {q ∈φj(yj) / @ q0 ∈ φj(yj) with q0
1(j)=q1(j) and q0
0(j) > q0(j)}
That is, for each yj ∈ Fj, the jth ﬁrm admits price vectors in φj that
include maximal prices for the capital goods required.
It is easy to see b φj(yj) is closed and non-empty, for all yj ∈ Fj.Y e t ,
b φj may not have a closed graph, because it will not be closed at kinks (ir-
respective of the convexity of Yj). That shows that this restriction does not
correspond to (unconstrained) proﬁt maximization when production sets are
convex. Put informally, the correspondence b φj is too small.
It is then natural to deﬁne competitive pricing as follows:
Deﬁnition 4 The competitive pricing rule for the jth ﬁrm, is a mapping
φ
∗
j : Fj → R 
+ such that, for each given yj ∈ Fj,φ
∗







j) → (q,yj) with q





The competitive pricing rule is made of those prices that satisfy both con-
strained proﬁt maximization and maximum prices for produced commodities,
and the convex hull of those prices that are limits of sequences with these
features.
The main properties of this pricing rule are collected in the next theorems:
Theorem 2 Suppose that axiom 1 holds. Then:
(i) φ
∗




j is a subcorrespondence of φj.
Part (i) of this theorem establishes that competitive pricing is “well be-
haved” (namely, φ
∗
j is a pricing rule that satisﬁes a set of conditions that
permits one to prove the existence of equilibrium using the results already
available). Part (ii) ensures that the participation constraint is not violated,
even though we are taking a price correspondence larger than b φj.
The next theorem refers to the relationship between competitive pricing
and proﬁt maximization. It is a generalization of the idea that when pro-









Theorem 3 Suppose that axiom 1 holds and that the set N(yj) of prices
that maximize proﬁts unconditionally at yj ∈ Fj is non-empty. Suppose
furthermore that there exists ε>0 such that δ(yj,ε) ∩ Yj is a convex set




The way in which this property is formulated aims at encompassing the
cases of nonconvex ﬁrms with convex parts. Bearing in mind that N(yj) 6= ∅
for all yj ∈ Fj when Yj is “convex”, the following result is immediate:
Corollary 1 Suppose that axiom 1 holds and that Yj is “convex”. Then, φ
∗
j
implies unconstrained proﬁt maximization.
4 Equilibrium
4.1 The existence of competitive pricing equilibrium
The next deﬁnition makes it precise the equilibrium notion:
Deﬁnition 5 A competitive pricing equilibrium is a price vector p∗ ∈
R 
+ − {0}, and an allocation [(x∗
i),e y∗], such that:
(α) For each i =1 ,2,...,m, x∗














That is, a competitive pricing equilibrium is a situation in which: (a)
Consumers maximize their preferences subject to their budget constraints;
(b) The jth ﬁrm agrees to produce y∗
j at prices p∗, for all j (that is, (p∗,e y∗)
is a production equilibrium relative to the competitive pricing rule); and (c)
All markets clear. Hence, an equilibrium consists of a price vector and a
feasible allocation in which all agents are maximizing their payoﬀ functions
within their feasible sets. These feasible sets correspond to budget sets for
the case of consumers, and production sets subject to an input constraint,
for the case of ﬁrms.
Observe that the equality between “supply” and demand is relevant, be-
cause it implies that there are no idle capital goods in equilibrium. Hence,
the equilibrium allocation of capital goods cannot be arbitrary. The prices of
capital goods cannot be arbitrary either: they generate a cost structure and
an income distribution that accommodates the equilibrium between “sup-
ply” and demand. Moreover, these are maximal prices compatible with con-









The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 4 Let E be a market economy that satisﬁes axioms 1, 2 and 3.
Then, there is a competitive pricing equilibrium (p∗,[(x∗
j),e y∗]).
Proof.
It is well established that, under axioms 1 to 3, an equilibrium exists
when the behaviour of individual ﬁrms can be described by closed pricing
rule correspondences, whose values are non-degenerate closed convex cones
and are “loss-free” [e.g. Bonnisseau & Cornet (1988, th. 2’)]. Theorem 2
shows that the competitive pricing rule satisﬁes these properties under axiom
1. Hence the result follows.
Theorem 4 tells us that there exists a competitive pricing equilibrium
under fairly general assumptions. Given the equilibrium allocation of capital
goods, the ﬁrms maximize proﬁts at given prices within their attainable sets.
In equilibrium no ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to operate with fewer inputs.
When production sets are convex a competitive pricing equilibrium is
nothing else than a standard competitive equilibrium. This follows immedi-
ately from Theorems 3 and 4. Formally:
Corollary 2 Let E be a market economy satisfying axioms 1 and 2. Suppose
furthermore Yj is “convex” for all j =1 ,2,...,n.Then a competitive pricing
equilibrium is a standard competitive equilibrium.
This corollary states that proﬁt maximization at given prices can be re-
garded as the outcome of the proﬁt principle and the scarcity principle, when
production sets are “convex”. This is so because, under convexity, relaxing
the input constraint does not make available more proﬁtable options at given
prices: local maximization implies global maximization. Therefore, the stan-
dard behaviour of competitive ﬁrms (proﬁt maximization at given prices),
may be regarded as ar e d u c e dm o d e lof a market economy in which ﬁrms pay
their reservation value for capital goods, due to the competition for those
scarce factors that limit production possibilities.
Scarf (1986, Th. 1) shows that the constrained proﬁt maximization pric-
ing rule includes prices for which qyj =0 , when the production set is dis-
tributive (see the deﬁnition in example 4 above). As competitive pricing is
a loss-free pricing rule, the next result follows:
Corollary 3 Let (p∗,[(x∗
j),e y∗]) be a competitive pricing equilibrium. If Yj










The eﬃciency analysis can be summarized in the following claims:
(i) Every competitive pricing equilibrium is eﬃcient conditional on the
allocation of capital goods.
(ii) Full eﬃciency fails because the price system does not ensure a right
allocation of capital goods due to the presence of non-convexities.
(iii) When p∗ ∈∩ n
j=1N(y∗
j) a competitive pricing equilibrium is fully
eﬃcient. This happens in particular when Yj is a convex set for all j.
(iv) Full eﬃciency can be attained by means of a public intervention that
guides the allocation of capital goods and adjsuts the income distribution by
taxing the proﬁts that consumers get.
L e tu sp r o v et h o s ec l a i m s .
Claim (i) is rather immediate. Taking the allocation of capital goods as
given, the resulting conditional economy is a conventional competitive one (in
the subspace of standard commodities). So the ﬁrst welfare theorem ensures
this outcome.
We prove claim (ii) by means of the following example. Consider an
economy with two ﬁrms and two commodities, corn and labour. Firm 1 is a
convex ﬁrm which produces eﬃciently λ units of corn by means of λ units of
labour. Firm 2 produces λ units of corn for every λ/2 units of labour (i.e.
it exhibits a better marginal rate of transformation), but requires incurring
a ﬁxed cost of −0.5. There are two identical consumers. Each consumer
is endowed with a unit of labour and only cares about the consumption of
corn (ﬂat indiﬀerence curves). At prices p =( 1 ,1) consumer i sells one unit
of labour and buys one unit of output to ﬁrm j, for j =1 ,2. T h i si sa
competitive pricing equilibrium in which labour is a capital good and two
units of output are obtained. It is clear that this equilibrium allocation is
not Pareto optimal, because it would be better to operate ﬁrm 2 exclusively,
as two units of labour applied to that ﬁrm produce three rather than two
units of output.2
Claim (iii) is obvious because in that case total proﬁts are maximized
and the result follows again from the standard argument that proves the ﬁrst
welfare theorem.
2Indeed, non-convexities in production imply that the allocation of capital goods in-
volves a public good feature that deﬁnes a public environment. See Hammond & Villar


















where αi describes the ith consumer’s share in total proﬁts intended by the
planner, with
Pm
i=1 αi =1 . Then,
Theorem 5 Let E be a market economy that satisﬁes axioms 1, 2 and 3
and let (τi)m
i=1 be a tax system. Then, there exists a competitive pricing
equilibrium with taxes that yields a Pareto optimal allocation.
Proof.
First recall that an equilibrium allocation is conditionally eﬃcient (that
is, is eﬃcient among those allocations that take the equilibrium allotment
of capital goods as given). Now observe that the aggregate production set,
Y =
Pn
j=1 Yj inherits all properties of the individual sets (i.e. the aggre-
gate production set satisﬁes axiom 1). So, deﬁne a new economy E0 that is
identical to E except in that now there is a single production set Y whose
proﬁts are distributed according the given shares (αi)m
i=1. As proﬁts are non-
negative, axioms 1, 2 and 3 ensure that an equilibrium for E0 exists (Theorem
4). It is trivial to see that this equilibrium is Pareto eﬃcient and corresponds
to a competitive pricing equilibrium with taxes on proﬁts, for the original
economy.
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5 A P P E N D I X :P r o o f so fT h e o r e m s2
and 3
Preliminaries
Let Y ⊂ R , y∗ ap o i n ti nY, and let Φ : Y → R  be a set valued mapping.
The limsup of Φ at y∗ is given by:
LSΦ(y








In words: By limsup of Φ at y∗ we denote the set of all points which are
limits of sequences of points pν ∈ Φ(yν),w h e nyν → y∗.O b s e r v et h a tw h e n
Φ is a closed correspondence LSΦ(y∗)=Φ(y∗),f o re a c hy∗ ∈ Y .W h e n
this is not so, the limsup may be thought of as an operator that “closes the
graph” of Φ. Observe that this does not mean that it coincides with Φ(y∗)
when Φ is closed-valued. It follows from the deﬁnition that if Φ(y) is a cone,
then LSΦ(y) is also a cone.
The following result is known [a proof can be found in Villar (1996, Prop.
5.1)].
Proposition 1 Let Y ⊂ R  b eac l o s e ds e t ,a n dΦ : Y → R 
+ ac o r r e -
spondence such that Φ(y) is a cone, for each y ∈ Y .D e ﬁne then a new
correspondence Γ : Y → R 
+ that associates to each y∗ ∈ Y the convex hull
of LS(y∗), that is, Γ(y∗)= CoLS(y∗). Then Γ has a closed graph.
Let Y be a closed and convex subset of R ,a n dy ∈ Y. The normal cone
of Y at y, NY(y),i sg i v e nb y :
NY(y) ≡ {p ∈ R
  | p(y
0 − y) ≤ 0,∀y
0 ∈ Y }
Thus when production sets are convex, the cone of normals at a given
point y gives us the set of prices for which this production plan is a proﬁt
maximizer at given prices.
The following lemma gives us the relationship between the normal cone
to a point y in the intersection of two convex sets, and the normal cones of
each individual set at y :
Lemma 1 (Rockafellar (1970, Corol. 23.8.1)) Let A, B be convex sets









The following proposition is obtained:




j)={(aj,bj) ∈ Yj / aj ≥ a0
j}, a convex set when Yj is convex.
Now observe that:













j),w h e r eC(a0
j)={(a,b) ∈ R  / a ≥ a0
j}.
B yL e m m a1w eh a v eNYj(a0
j)(y0)=NYj(y0)+NC(a0
j)(y0). It is easy to see
that NC(a0
j)(y0)={(qK,qS) ∈− R 






0) − {(qK,qS) ∈ R
 





From this expression it follows immediately that b φ(y) ⊂ NY(y). In par-
ticular, when NYj(y0) is a half-line b φj(y0
j)=NY(y).
The next result, that appears in Dehez & Drèze (1988a, Lemma 7) as
communicated by B. Cornet, says that a closed convex and comprehensive
production set is almost everywhere smooth. Formally:
Proposition 3 Let T be a non-empty, closed, convex and comprehensive
subset of R , with T 6= R . Then there exists a dense subset D ⊂ ∂T such
that the normal cone is a half-line at every point in D and can be deﬁned,








ν ∈ D, p
ν ∈ N(y
ν) ∀ ν}
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2
(i) Axiom 1 implies that φ
∗
j(yj) is a closed convex cone, for every yj ∈ Fj.
We have already shown that, under axioms 1 to 3, the constrained proﬁt
maximization pricing rule is non-empty valued. From this it follows imme-
diately that φ
∗
j(yj) is a non-degenerate closed convex cone, and Proposition
1e n s u r e st h a tφ
∗
j is closed.
(ii) As b φj(yj) ⊂ φj(yj), t h eo n l yc a s et ob ec o n s i d e r e di st h a ti nw h i c h
φ
∗
j(yj) 6= b φj(yj). Let p be a price vector that is in φ
∗
j(yj) but is not in
b φj(yj). By deﬁnition, p =
P +1
i=1 λiqi, where each qi ∈ R 
+ is a limit point of
a sequence (qν,yν
j) with qν ∈ b φj(yν
j), yν
j ∈ Fj, yν








(Theorem 1), each of these qi belongs to φj, that is a closed convex cone.
Therefore, p ∈ φj(yj) as well. Hence, φ
∗
j is a subcorrespondence of φj.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3
Suppose ﬁrst that NYj(yj) is a half-line. From Proposition 2 we know
that b φj(y)=NYj(yj). Moreover, φ
∗
j(yj)=b φj(yj), because in this case b φj is
closed at yj. Hence, φ
∗
j(yj)=NYj(yj).
Let now Tj(yj,ε)=ch{B(yj,ε) ∩ Yj}, where ch{.} denotes the compre-
hensive hull, and B(yj,ε) is a closed ball of center yj and radius ε>0. By
assumption B(yj,ε) ∩ Yj is convex. Thus we can apply Proposition 3 that






j) → (p,yj), y
ν
j ∈ Dj, p
ν ∈ b φj(y
ν
j) ∀ ν}
The desired equality follows when the sequences are taken in Tj(yj,ε)\Dj
as well.
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